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HusBAND AND WIFE-WIFE's RIGHT To RECOVER FOR Loss OF "CoNsoRTIUM" DuE To INJURY To HusBAND FROM WRONGFUL SALE OF LIQUOR

- Plaintiff sued for loss of her right of consortium occasioned by the illness and
death of her husband as a result of a sale of liquor by defendant in violation of a
state statute.1 Defendant demurred on the ground that there was no cause of
action granted by the statute for damages flowing from such an illegal sale. Held,
an action for injury to the wife's right of consortium was available at common
law. Swanson v. Ball, (S. D. 1940) 290 N. W. 482.
An Ohio court has defined consortium as including the affection, solace,
comfort, companionship and society incidental to the marital relationship and the
services of the wife. 2 At common law, the marriage compact established the right
of consortium in the husband and courts have justifiably protected this right
against willful or negligent injury.3 The wife, however, had no legal right to
the services of the husband 4 as she became a legal nonentity at marriage,5 and

1 ''No licensee shall sell any intoxicating liquor ••• To any person to whom the
seller has been requested in writing not to make such a sale, where such request is by
.•• the husband, wife ••• of the person ..••" S. D. Code (1939), § 5.0226 (2).
2 Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N. E. 204 (1915). This
action is to be distinguished from the statutory actions for wrongful death or for loss
of means of support.
8 ". • • and it seems to be a most reasonable proposition of law that whoever
willfully joins with a married woman in doing an act which deprives her husband
of her services and of her companionship is liable to the husband in damages for
hi_s conduct." Holleman v. Harward, 119 N. C. 150 at 154, 25 S. E. 972 (1896);
Elling v. Blake-McFall Co., 85 Ore. 91, 166 P. 57 (1917) (recovery for personal
injury to wife negligently inflicted). But see contra cases in note 15, infra.
4 Jaynes v. Jaynes, 39 Hun (46 N. Y. S. Ct.) 40 (1886); I BoUVIER, INSTITUTES
OF AMERICAN LAw n5-116, Nos. 277-279 (1851).
5 Bassett v. Bassett, 20 Ill. App. 543 (1886).

RECENT DECISIONS

821

any rights she might have had could be enforced only by joining the husband and
subject to the attendant limitations on an action by him. 6 Yet even at common
law a divided court declared that the right of consortium existed in the wife
and under proper circumstances could be enforced. 7 The course of the common
law was universally altered by the Married Woman's Acts designed to place the
wife on a legal parity with the husband. 8 For the :first time resort by the wife
to enforcement of a right of consortium became generally practical.9 In view of
the purpose of the legislation for the emancipation of married women,1° it
seems logical that the courts should recognize a right in the wife coextensive
with that of the husband, and the principal case gives substantial support to this
conclusion. Courts follow this analogy and allow the wife to recover when the
case involves injury caused by the willful or malicious acts of the defendant.
Their language in these decisions seems to indicate that the scope of the wife's
right is to be determined by the common-law scope of the husband's right.11
On the other hand, when faced with a case where the injury to the wife's interest is caused by negligent acts, courts categorically deny recovery •12 In this
situation, the reasoning is that the Married Woman's Acts serve only to lift
the wife's common-law disability to sue and give her no new substantive rights,
and that since she could not recover for consortium at common law she has
no right to enforce now.18 Fundamentally, this divergence in result seems un6 Ibid. As the husband was entitled to the sum recovered, his participation in the
unlawful act was a· bar to the joint action.
7 "Nor can I allow that the loss of consortium, or conjugal society, can give a
cause of action to the husband alone." Lord Campbell in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. C.
577 at 589, I l Eng. Rep. 854 (1861). This argument assumes a right without a
remedy. See Lippman, "The Breakdown of Consortium," 30 CoL. L. REV. 651 at 665
et seq. (1930).
8
"She now loses none of the 'rights' pertaining to natural persons, that of personal security, personal liberty and of private property, by marriage to any greater
extent than does the man." Bassett v. Bassett, 20 Ill. App. 543 at 547 (1886).
9 A cause of action for alienation of affection and for criminal conversation was
first accorded the wife, probably due to the public interest in morals. However, a Connecticut court was willing to extend relief here on the ground that the right was coextensive with that of the husband. Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 A. 1027 (1890).
10
"The majority view which thus gives the husband an action for a negligent injury to the wife, yet which denies a similar action to her, is logically inconsistent in
view of the equality of married women .•.• Contrary statements, however, have been
made by some courts in cases where there was also the probability that the marital
relation would be injured if the act was done." 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS
(HUSBAND AND WIFE) 86-87 (1935). As the husband is allowed compensatory damages for injury to his right of "consortium," the wife's recovery should not be limited
to punitive damages (requiring an intentional breach by defendant) as stated in the
Massachusetts and Indiana cases. Feneff v. New York Central & H. R. R., 203 Mass.
278, 89 N. E. 436 (1909); Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N. E. 631 (1912).
11
Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E. 102 (19u); Foot v.
Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 A. 1027 (1890); Moberg v. Scott, 38 S. D. 422, 161 N. W.

998 (1917).
12
Emersonian Apts. v. Taylor, 132 Md. 209, 103 A. 423, 5 A. L. R. 1045 at
1049 (1918); see also annotation 59 A. L. R. 680 (1929).
18
Cravens v. Louisville & N. Ry., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S. W. 628 (1922); see
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sound. In both situations the wife has suffered the same type of injury and in
neither can there be reparation other than by resort to a consortium theory.14
Admittedly, there may be important policy considerations which would lead
a court to deny consortium to either spouse.15 However, when recovery is allowed, it seems illogical and unfair to grant the husband a full and the wife
only a partial right.
C Wh.itehead
i iam •
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also cases cited in note 12, supra. More rational grounds for the result are suggested in
Pound, "Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations," 14 MxcH. L. REV. 177 at
193 et seq. (1916).
14 The unreasonable results of this distinction could have been avoided by a
holding that the husband's rights accrued to him in his capacity as a spouse, not
merely as a husband, and that therefore when the wife became a legal entity by statute
she should have the same rights and receive the same protection that her marriage part~
ner enjoyed. See Holbrook, "The Change in the Meaning of Consortium," 22 M1cH.
L. REv. I (1923).
15 Where recovery for consortium is allowed, two people, the spouse directly
injured and the spouse whose consortium is injured, are able to recover. Some courts
have therefore denied recovery to the husband since the Married Woman's Acts took
effect. Marri v. Stamford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 (1911); Golden v. R. L.
Greene Paper Co., 44 R. I. 231, 116 A. 579 (1922); Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods
Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N. W. 724 (1915).

